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Stress Testing During Stressful Times: How COVID-19 
Could Influence the Role of Stress Testing and 
Prudential Financial Regulation 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Often, we ask ourselves whether we can predict the future.  While 
a few predicted some sort of global pandemic, most never expected it to 
occur within their lifetime.1  If most people could not have predicted such 
an outbreak, should we expect any more from our banking system?  In 
2008, the answer was no.2  When the 2008 Financial Crisis devastated the 
housing market and economy, banks were not prepared, resulting in the 
worst economic disaster since the Great Depression.3 
To strengthen the U.S. banking system for the future, Congress 
enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (“Dodd-Frank”) in 2010.4  Among its innovations were mandated 
stress tests, models that help analyze banks’ capital positions under harsh 
economic conditions.5  The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program 
(“SCAP”), in place before the passage of Dodd-Frank, pioneered the first 
use of stress tests for the nineteen institutions with assets in excess of 
$100 billion.6  Before these institutions were permitted to repay their 
 
1. See Hillary Hoffower, Bill Gates Has Been Warning of a Global Health Threat For 
Years. Here Are 12 People Who Seemingly Predicted the Coronavirus Pandemic., BUS. 
INSIDER (Dec. 15, 2020, 10:36AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/people-who-
seemingly-predicted-the-coronavirus-pandemic-2020-3 [https://perma.cc/ALD3-4LSA] 
(inferring that only a few individuals predicted the COVID-19 pandemic and its lasting 
impacts). 
2. See Martin Neil Baily et al., The Origins of the Financial Crisis, BROOKINGS (Nov. 24, 
2008), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-origins-of-the-financial-crisis/ 
[https://perma.cc/AQZ5-BR5C] (noting the reasons for the financial crisis, such as how the 
banks were not adequately capitalized to endure a financial crisis). 
3. Id.  
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 6, 12 
U.S.C. § 5300 (2018). 
5. Dodd-Frank § 6, 12 U.S.C. § 5365. 
6. See Tim P. Clark & Lisa H. Ryu, CCAR and Stress Testing as Complementary 
Supervisory Tools, FED. RES. BD. (June 24, 2015), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/ccar-and-stress-testing-as-complementary-
supervisory-tools.htm [https://perma.cc/96ZQ-RQJ5] (providing a detailed history of the 
creation of SCAP, the first stress test program to evaluate the strength of banks’ capital against 
harsh economic scenarios). 
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Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”) funding and rid themselves of 
the government as a preferred shareholder, they needed to pass the stress 
test or raise the additional capital7 needed to pass the stress test.8  These 
tests were critical to restoring confidence in the U.S. banking system in 
the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis.9  Inspired by the success of 
SCAP, the Dodd-Frank Act set forth the Dodd-Frank Act Stress Tests 
(“DFAST”) and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board 
System (“Federal Reserve Board”) created the Comprehensive Capital 
Analysis and Review Program (“CCAR”) to analyze the capital of banks 
on an annual basis.10 
Over time, CCAR and DFAST underwent a variety of changes, 
and have since deviated from their original purpose.11  The COVID-19 
pandemic was the first true test of CCAR and DFAST, and what resulted 
was confusion and concern about the state of the U.S. banking system.12  
Conversely, stress tests are essential to maintaining  confidence in the 
U.S. banking system and help banks safely conserve capital to prepare 
for future economic crises.13  COVID-19 did not reveal the weaknesses 
in the banking system, but instead highlighted the flaws of the CCAR and 
DFAST process during another financial crisis.14  Therefore, the Federal 
Reserve Board should learn from the past, seek global influence, and 
 
7. See Marshall Hargrave, Capital, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capital.asp [https://perma.cc/73R5-GFXZ] (defining 
capital as the composition of equity, borrowing and investments that allow for a bank to 
operate its business). 
8. See Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) Information, FED. RES. BD. (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/tarpinfo.htm [https://perma.cc/JS98-VYK9] 
(providing a brief overview of the TARP program). 
9. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (discussing the importance of SCAP, the first stress test 
program to evaluate the strength of banks’ capital against harsh economic scenarios). 
10. Dodd-Frank § 6, 12 U.S.C. § 5365. 
11. Id.  (noting the regulatory changes over time, such as raising the CCAR minimum 
capital requirement from $50 to $250 billion); see also Clark & Ryu, supra note 6, at 1 
(referencing several of the changes that CCAR and DFAST have experienced overtime).  
12. See Rob Blackwell, Virus is Dodd-Frank's First Real Test, AM. BANKER (Mar. 13, 
2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/coronavirus-is-dodd-franks-first-
real-test [https://perma.cc/QC5T-A4WG] (stating how Dodd-Frank will likely be impacted 
by the economic wave that COVID-19 will have on the banking system).  
13. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (detailing the value and purpose of stress testing within 
the U.S. economy). 
14. See Daniel K. Tarullo, Are We Seeing the Demise of Stress-Testing?, BROOKINGS (June 
25, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2020/06/25/stress-testing/ 
[https://perma.cc/FR2B-JB5T] (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve 
Board’s confusing 2020 release of bank stress-tests). 
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reimplement the flexible, procedural response of SCAP that helped 
restore confidence in the U.S. banks in 2009.15  
This Note discusses the development of stress testing and 
analyzes how COVID-19 has further shaped the arguments for and 
against this regulatory framework. This discussion ultimately leads to the 
conclusion that while the stress test programs have encouraged big banks 
to remain better capitalized over time, many of the beneficial procedural 
aspects of stress tests have since been weakened, reducing the credibility 
of the programs. This Note Proceeds in five parts. Part II highlights the 
Dodd-Frank Act regulatory framework that led to the development of 
CCAR and DFAST, while noting the subtle differences between the two 
programs.16  Part III then examines the impact of COVID-19 on the 
release of the annual stress tests and considers how both the Federal 
Reserve Board and the public have reacted to the Federal Reserve 
Board’s actions.17  Part IV provides alternatives to performing stress tests 
during a global pandemic and other periods of market stress and crisis.18  
Finally, Part V concludes by restating the necessity of proper procedural 
standards upon both the performance and release of the annual stress test 
programs. 19  
II.  WHAT ARE CCAR AND DFAST, AND WHY DO WE HAVE THEM? 
A.         Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act 
Among the many reasons for the Financial Crisis in 2008 was 
risk.20  Risk21 rapidly increased in 2004 when the Securities and 
 
15. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (stating how SCAP helped to restore confidence between 
market participants and the U.S. banking system); see also Huw Jones & Francesco Canepa, 
EU Delays Banks Stress Test, Eases Capital Rules on Coronavirus, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2020, 
9:21 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-eu-banks/eu-delays-banks-
stress-test-eases-capital-rules-on-coronavirus-idUSKBN20Z20W [https://perma.cc/65F6-
KCQK] (noting the decrease in capital requirements instilled by the EU’s decision to postpone 
stress testing in light of the pandemic). 
16. See infra Part II. 
17. See infra Part III. 
18. See infra Part IV. 
19. See infra Part V. 
20. See Joe Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 2, 2009), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html [https://perma.cc/6TNC-
V4RB] (emphasis added) (defining the risk taken on by big banks as an influential factor of 
the 2008 Financial Crisis).    
21. What is Risk?, U.S. SECS. AND EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/investing-basics/what-risk [https://perma.cc/7FP9-9SAS] (last visited Jan. 30, 
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Exchange Commission (“SEC”) loosened the net capital requirement.22  
Capital, in the commercial sense, is composed of equity contributed by 
shareholders, retained earnings over time, and long-term funds.23  This 
increased risk, in addition to the lending of subprime mortgages that 
allowed big banks to profit from risky mortgage-backed securities, 
ultimately led to the collapse of the U.S. economy in 2008.24  The Great 
Recession saw the U.S. unemployment rate peak at 10% in 2009 and the 
failure of more than 450 commercial banks across the country.25 
In an immediate response to the 2008 Financial Crisis, Congress 
passed the Dodd-Frank Act26 “to promote the financial stability of the 
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the 
financial system.”27  The Act aims to protect consumers by preventing 
banks from “abusive financial services practices” and “by ending 
bailouts.”28  To further this purpose, the Act requires the Federal Reserve 
Board to conduct and publicly disclose annual stress tests to help banks 
determine whether they can continue lending to households and 
businesses, even during a severe recession like that of 2008.29  These 
scenarios serve as a tool to help big banks measure their capital under 
baseline, adverse, and severely adverse models.30 
Before the development of the CCAR and DFAST programs, the 
Federal Reserve Board established SCAP in 2009.31  This program took 
 
2021) (defining risk as “the degree of uncertainty and/or potential financial loss inherent in 
an investment decision”). 
22. See Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 2, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/business/03sec.html 
[https://perma.cc/FV3T-P5X5] (providing an overview of the reasons for the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, including the loosened net capital requirement by the SEC in 2004).  
23. See Hargrave, supra note 7 (defining capital).  
24. See ERIN COGHLAN, ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY INST. FOR RES. ON LABOR AND 
EMP’T, WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE GREAT RECESSION? (2018), https://irle.berkeley.edu/what-
really-caused-the-great-recession/ [https://perma.cc/PY4M-54P5] (describing the various 
factors that led to the 2008 Financial Crisis, such as the collapse of the housing market and 
the lending of subprime mortgages).  
25. Id.  
26. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
27. Id.  
28. Id. 
29. See Dodd-Frank § 165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2010) (noting that there are annual stress 
tests conducted by the Federal Reserve Board for companies with greater than $50 billion in 
assets, now $250 billion after the Economic Growth Act of 2018, and company-run stress 
tests for companies with greater than $10 billion in assets).   
30. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (discussing the three scenarios that vary in harshness in 
economic conditions that the Federal Reserve Board uses to determine the metrics for the 
stress tests). 
31. Id. 
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place during the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis and aimed to 
create simultaneous stress tests for the nineteen biggest bank holding 
companies32 as they faced deteriorating conditions in the financial 
markets.33  To ease concerns about the future of the U.S. economy, SCAP 
required these banks to participate in a stress test based on economic 
scenarios harsher than the 2008 Financial Crisis and publicly disclose 
those results.34  The stress test measured whether these nineteen banks 
had enough capital to absorb future losses while still being able to operate 
under the harsh scenarios.35  Banks that failed the test were given one 
month to develop a capital plan and six months to raise the necessary 
amount of capital to meet their plan.36  While ten of the nineteen banks 
initially failed the stress test, almost all of them were able to meet their 
capital plans within the required six months.37  
In addition to providing economic stability to the markets, the 
hastily-established SCAP also yielded several other important results.38  
By publicly disclosing the stress test results of the nineteen largest bank 
holding companies, the program created transparency between banks and 
market participants.39  Additionally, this disclosure added credibility to 
the process itself and helped ease fears about the financial health of the 
big banks.40  In other words, SCAP helped to “restore confidence in the 
U.S. banking system.”41 
B.         The Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review Program 
Inspired by the success of SCAP, the Federal Reserve Board 
established the Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review Program in 
 
32. Cf. National Information Center, FED. FIN. INSTS.  EXAMINATION COUNCIL, 
https://www.ffiec.gov/npw/Institution/TopHoldings [https://perma.cc/NX2J-SWDU] (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2021) (providing a list of the current biggest bank holding companies—as 
calculated by total assets—in the U.S.). 
32. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (defining a bank holding company as a company that 
either controls or owns one or more U.S. banks).  
33. Id. 
34. See id. (emphasizing that one of the successful elements of SCAP was to publicly 




38. See id. (noting how SCAP restored confidence in the American public and helped banks 
better manage their capital). 
39. Id.  
40. Id. 
41. See id. (stating that the public disclosure element of the stress tests and honesty with 
the public restored confidence in the banking system after such a devastating financial crisis). 
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2010.42  While CCAR is complementary to DFAST, the programs use 
different testing exercises while measuring similar data and 
requirements.43  CCAR is an annual exercise conducted by the Federal 
Reserve Board that analyzes whether the capital plans and expected 
capital distributions of big banks are sufficient to survive times of 
economic and financial stress.44  The program helps ensure that banks are 
taking a forward-looking approach, in which they can restructure their 
capital plans to make sure there is enough capital in place to continue 
operations throughout times of economic stress.45  The tests are measured 
by “post-stress capital ratios” that incorporate large bank holding 
companies’ “planned capital action over the nine-quarter planning 
horizon under their baseline scenario.”46  The stress tests help banks 
gauge whether they would remain above the minimum capital 
requirements with their baseline capital actions under stressful 
conditions.47  
CCAR has changed since its initial implementation.48  In its early 
years, CCAR applied to bank holding companies with assets49 of $50 
billion or more, which at that time included the thirty biggest banks in the 
United States.50  In 2019, the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and 
Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”) raised the threshold minimum 
to $250 billion in total assets.51  
Since its implementation, compliance with CCAR has helped 
these banks secure large amounts of capital to protect themselves from 
future economic crisis.52  For example, one of the key CCAR 
 
42. See id. (providing a detailed history on the creation of CCAR, which acts as an annual 
measuring tool of the capital adequacy of big banks). 
43. Id.  
44. See Stress Tests and Capital Planning, FED. RES. BD. (Aug. 10, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/stress-tests-capital-planning.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5WHZ-EFGA] (providing a brief overview of the CCAR program). 
45. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6. 
46. Id. 
47. See id. (describing scenarios such as sharp changes in gross domestic product and the 
unemployment rate).  
48. See Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 
(“EGRRCPA”), Pub. L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018) (detailing legislative changes to 
the regulatory requirements of CCAR). 
49. See 12 C.F.R. § 252.12 (2020) (defining the current asset threshold as the average total 
consolidated assets of greater than $250 billion).  
50. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6. 
51. See 132 Stat. 1296 (describing a regulatory relief package that included the lessening 
of the minimum capital requirement for CCAR testing). 
52. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6. 
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measurements is Common Equity Tier 1 ratio (“CET1”).53  CET1 
measures the obvious equity that a bank holds, such as its common stock, 
treasury stock, retained earnings, and certain Accumulated Other 
Comprehensive Income (“AOCI”), and compares it against the bank’s 
risk-adjusted assets.54  For the eighteen banks that have participated in 
CCAR since 2013, this ratio has doubled from 5.6% to 11.3%.55  Since 
its establishment, CCAR has helped banks create better risk management 
practices to ensure a healthy banking system.56  
C.         The Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test Program 
Like CCAR, the DFAST Program stemmed from the influence of 
SCAP and was established in 2010.57  While its purpose is similar, 
DFAST can be distinguished from CCAR in two ways.58  First, DFAST 
reaches a larger number of banks with a minimum asset threshold 
requirement of $10 billion.59 On the other hand, CCAR’s initial $50 
billion minimum asset threshold increased to $250 billion in 2018.60  
Second, DFAST requires regulated banks to produce their own internal 
stress test, instead of being directly conducted by the Federal Reserve 
Board.61  
DFAST, like CCAR, conducts annual supervisory tests under 
three scenarios: baseline, adverse, and severely adverse.62  The baseline 
scenario measures a set of conditions that reflect the general views of 
both the economic and financial outlook of the United States economy 
with respect to the financial condition of a covered bank.63  The severely 





56. See id. (noting how banks have better managed their capital overtime due to the Dodd-
Frank and CCAR regulations). 
57. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
165(i), 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i) (2018).  
58. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6. 
59. Dodd-Frank § 165(i), 12 U.S.C. 5365(i)(1). 
60. Id.  
61. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6. 
62. See id. (stating the three scenarios of measurement under DFAST and CCAR).  
63. 12 C.F.R. § 325.2(c) (2020) (“Covered bank means any state nonmember bank or state 
savings association with average total consolidated assets calculated as required under this 
part that are greater than $250 billion.”); see also 12 C.F.R. § 325.2(b) (2020) (defining the 
baseline scenario of the Dodd-Frank stress tests).  
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the baseline scenario and includes additional components such as trading 
conditions.64  
 The more severe scenarios are not meant to forecast the future of 
the United States economy like with the baseline test; rather, they provide 
scenarios for a series of hypothetical sets of events designed to test the 
resilience of banking organizations.65  The scenarios are composed of 
twenty-eight variables, ranging from gross domestic product, stock 
market prices, interest rates, and unemployment rates that are calculated 
accordingly to the three economic models.66  In 2020, however, even the 
most severe of scenarios proved to be less harsh than the economic 
conditions brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic.67  
III.  CCAR AND DFAST IN 2020: THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 
On January 1, 2020, the United States confirmed the first case of 
COVID-19 within its borders.68  Thirty days later, the World Health 
Organization declared a global health emergency.69 As the pandemic 
ensued, banks reacted slowly.70  For example, at the beginning of the 
 
64. 12 C.F.R. § 325.2(j) (2020) (defining the severely adverse scenario under DFAST and 
CCAR, but not including the adverse scenario in its statutory definition as the adverse scenario 
constantly changes). 
65. Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Releases Hypothetical Scenarios 
for its 2020 Stress Test Exercises, FED. RESERVE, (Feb. 6, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200206a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/TF9Q-GMNZ] [hereinafter Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 Stress Test 
Exercises] (releasing the hypothetical metrics regarding the annual stress tests for 2020). 
66. Id. 
67. Press Release, Randal K. Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Fed. Reserve, Statement 
by Vice Chair for Supervision Quarles (June 25, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/quarles-statement-20200625c.htm 
[https://perma.cc/SJ74-FAE2]; see also Unemployment Rate 16.1 Percent in Massachusetts, 
4.5 Percent in Utah, in July 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF L. STAT.: ECON. DAILY (Aug. 27, 2020), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2020/unemployment-rate-16-point-1-percent-in-
massachusetts-4-point-5-percent-in-utah-in-july-2020.htm [https://perma.cc/H9C6-NXN5] 
[hereinafter Unemployment Rate 16.1 Percent in Massachusetts] (explaining the sudden rises 
in the unemployment rate due to COVID-19).  
68. See Grace Hauck, Five Months in: A Timeline of How COVID-19 Has Unfolded in the 
US, USA TODAY (June 23, 2020, 6:21  AM), https://www.usatoday.com/in-
depth/news/nation/2020/04/21/coronavirus-updates-how-covid-19-unfolded-u-s-
timeline/2990956001/ [https://perma.cc/GE4T-8DUA] (providing a detailed timeline of the 
evolution of COVID-19 and its impact on the United States). 
69. Id.  
70. See Daphne Foreman, 6 Months In: How Banks and Bankers Are Responding to Covid-
19, FORBES (Sep. 11, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/advisor/banking/6-months-
in-how-banks-and-bankers-are-responding-to-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/W2WX-AGPU] 
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pandemic, only a few banks posted COVID-19 notifications on their 
website.71  Before long, however, several banks started to waive fees on 
products and services relating to bank accounts, mortgages, and credit 
cards.72  As many borrowers began to struggle due to the immediate shut 
down of businesses and the sudden increase of unemployment, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) encouraged banks to 
work with these individuals and businesses to alleviate further 
pressures.73  Additionally, many banks shifted to mobile and online 
banking, while also eliminating ATM fees and waiving early withdrawal 
fees.74  
A.         The February 2020 Release of Stress Test Scenarios  
On February 5, 2020, the Federal Reserve Board released the 
hypothetical scenarios for the 2020 stress tests.75  Combining both CCAR 
and DFAST, the Federal Reserve Board analyzed thirty-four big banks 
with at least $100 billion in total assets.76  For 2020, the tests analyzed 
the banks under the baseline and severely adverse scenario.77  Both the 
baseline and severely adverse scenarios incorporated twenty-eight 
variables subject to economic volatility, including the employment rate, 
interest rates, stock market prices, and gross domestic product.78 Under 
the severely adverse scenario, which included harsh conditions likened to 
a severe global recession, the unemployment rate rose rapidly from 6.5% 
to 10%, with additional stress in both the corporate debt and commercial 
real estate markets.79 
 
(noting how banks overtime implemented more online-based services, but not immediately 
during the brunt of COVID-19). 
71. See id. (noting how banks delayed in posting COVID-19 affected services on their 
websites). 
72. Id. (indicating that after a short delay, banks started to switch to online banking and the 
new concerns of its customers). 
73. See id. (indicating that after a short delay, banks started to switch to online banking to 
address the concerns of their customers).  
74. Id.  
75. Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 Stress Test Exercises, supra note 65. 
76. Id.  
77. See id. (leaving out the middle, adverse scenario, from the 2020 analyses); see also 12 
C.F.R. § 325.2(b), (j) (2020) (defining the baseline and severely adverse scenarios used in the 
stress tests).  
78. Foreman, supra note 70.  
79. Id. 
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The test also incorporated global market influences.80  Banks with 
large trading operations had to incorporate a global market shock 
component in which international markets were factored into their 
analysis.81  These shock features included “heightened stress to trading 
book exposures to leveraged loans,” and required that firms with 
significant global trading provide a counterparty default scenario 
component.82  This latter component measures the probability that the 
other party involved in the trade may default on its obligation.83   
Qualifying banks were required to submit their capital plans to 
the Federal Reserve Board by April 6, with the results to be released by 
June 30.84  However, as the banks prepared their capital plans for 2020 in 
the following months, the original test was immediately rendered stale.85  
For example, the U.S. unemployment rate jumped from 4.5% in March 
to 14.7% in April, exceeding the severely adverse scenario of 10% set out 
in February for the 2020 stress test.86  As unemployment rapidly 
increased and gross domestic product declined, the stress test became out 
of touch with reality.87  
B.         The June 2020 Results and the New Sensitivity Analysis 
On June 25, 2020, the Federal Reserve Board released the results 
of the 2020 stress test, along with a newly developed sensitivity analysis 
in light of COVID-19.88  In its original release, the Federal Reserve Board 
 
80. See id. (defining global market influences as heightened stress to trading book 
exposures to leveraged loans and counterparty default scenarios, and including banks such as 
Goldman Sachs, Bank of America and Wells Fargo). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Counterparty Risk, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (2020), 
https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/supervision-and-examination/capital-markets/financial-
markets/counterparty-risk/index-counterparty-risk.html [https://perma.cc/4V58-B8RE]. 
84. Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 Stress Test Exercises, supra note 65. 
85. See Tarullo, supra note 14 (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve 
Board’s confusing 2020 release of bank stress tests).  
86. Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 Stress Test Exercises, supra note 65; see also 
Unemployment Rate Rises to Record High 14.7 Percent in April 2020, U.S. BUREAU OF L. 
STAT.: ECON. DAILY (May 13, 2020), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2020/unemployment-
rate-rises-to-record-high-14-point-7-percent-in-april-2020.htm [https://perma.cc/S2LU-
P3FT] (describing the rapid changes in unemployment due to COVID-19).  
87. Tarullo, supra note 14. 
88. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Releases Results of Stress 
Tests for 2020 and Additional Sensitivity Analyses Conducted in Light of the Coronavirus 
Event (June 25, 2020), 
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briefly noted that the original February 2020 stress test under the severely 
adverse model yielded similar metrics as the V-shaped recession and 
recovery model, as discussed below, under the new sensitivity analysis.89  
Additionally, the Federal Reserve Board stated that all of the banks 
involved in the February 2020 test remained strongly capitalized under 
both models.90  
The Federal Reserve Board also conducted a new sensitivity 
analysis in the aggregate to better align with the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic.91  The new test presented three downside scenarios: a V-
shaped recession and recovery; a U-shaped recession and recovery; and 
a W-shaped, double-dip recession.92  In these scenarios, the 
unemployment rate ranged between 15.6% and 19.5%, a significant jump 
from the 10% maximum set for the severely adverse scenario presented 
in February.93  Unemployment at these rates would likely cause 
individuals to default on car loans, credit card debt, mortgages, and 
student loans, further negatively affecting banks.94  
The new sensitivity analysis results were released in aggregate 
for the thirty-four banks originally included in the February 2020 
analysis, leaving out any bank-specific information.95 The results 
revealed that the banks involved in the sensitivity analysis experienced 
 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200625c.htm 
[https://perma.cc/P8MU-HZFE] [hereinafter Additional Sensitivity Analyses] (stating the 
results of both the 2020 stress tests and the additional sensitivity analysis). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id.  
92. Id.; see also Sarah Hansen, U-Shape? V-Shape? Recovery Shapes Explained And What 
They Mean For America’s Economy, FORBES (June 3, 2020), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahhansen/2020/06/03/u-shape-v-shape-recovery-shapes-
explained-and-what-they-mean-for-americas-economy/?sh=6762a41125a5 
[https://perma.cc/22S8-287K] (defining a V-shaped recession and recovery as one where the 
economy bounces back quickly to the baseline, a U-shaped recession and recovery as one 
where the economic damages lasts for a longer period of time before recovery, and a W-
shaped recession and recovery as one where the economy recovers from one recession to only 
fall into another before eventually reaching baseline recovery). 
93. Additional Sensitivity Analyses, supra note 88; Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 
Stress Test Exercises, supra note 65. 
94. See Maya Rodriguez Valladares, Rising Unemployment and Imminent Corporate 
Defaults Will Hurt Banks’ Profitability and Capital, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2020), 
https://ww8w.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2020/03/26/rising-unemployment-
and-imminent-corporate-defaults-will-hurt-banks-profitability-and-
capital/?sh=33955079654b [https://perma.cc/4884-ZMFH] (discussing the impacts that sharp 
changes in the unemployment rate could have on the U.S. economy).  
95. Additional Sensitivity Analyses, supra note 88. 
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aggregate loan losses ranging from $560 to $700 billion and capital ratios 
declined from 12% in the fourth quarter of 2019 to between 7.7% and 
9.5%.96   Under both the U and W-shaped scenarios, most of the banks 
involved remain well capitalized but several would approach their 
minimum capital levels.97  Even so, Vice Chair Randal Quarles stated that 
“the results of our sensitivity analysis show that our banks can remain 
strong in the face of even the harshest shocks.”98  
In response to these results, the Federal Reserve Board took 
several actions to ensure that the banks remain well-capitalized even with 
the economic uncertainty of COVID-19.99  For the third quarter of 2020, 
the Federal Reserve Board required that banks preserve capital by 
suspending share purchases and capping dividend payments, while only 
allowing the distribution of dividends according to an income-based 
formula.100  Additionally, banks were required to resubmit their capital 
plans in October 2020.101  
Shortly following the release of the new sensitivity analysis 
scenarios, the Federal Reserve Board also announced new capital 
requirements for the big banks effective October 1, 2020.102   The metrics 
are individualized to each bank, however the minimum CET1 Capital 
Ratio for all banks is 4.5%.103   Additionally, the stress capital buffer, 
which is a way to ensure that banks have extra usable capital against 





99. See id. (including actions such as capping dividend payments and suspending share 
purchases to ensure banks are adequately protecting their capital).  
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Announces Individual Large 
Bank Capital Requirements, Which will be Effective on October 1 (Aug. 10, 2020) 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200810a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/P8MU-HZFE] [hereinafter Large Bank Capital Requirements].  
103. Id.; see also What is Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)?, CORP. FIN. INST. (last visited 
Sept. 12, 2020, 10:35AM), 
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/finance/common-equity-tier-1-
cet1/ [https://perma.cc/F5NF-4Q5L] (defining the minimum capital requirement as a metric 
calculated by dividing the firm’s tier 1 capital—such as cash and stocks—by its total assets).  
104. Large Bank Capital Requirements, supra note 102 (stating the updated requirements 
for larger banks as well as establishing a timeline for response); see also The Capital Buffers 
in Basel III, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS (Nov. 28, 2019), 
https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsisummaries/b3_capital.htm [https://perma.cc/7NRV-ZF4Y] (“The 
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banks also serve as global systemically important banks (“G-SIBs”)105 
and are required to keep a capital surcharge of at least 1.0%.106   This 
surcharge requires G-SIBs to maintain an additional capital supply to 
protect from losses and harsh economic scenarios.107 
C.         The Third Test of 2020: The Mid-Cycle Stress Test 
In addition to the February 2020 stress test and the new sensitivity 
analysis conducted from February to June 2020, the Federal Reserve 
Board released another test to measure the uncertainty imposed by the 
COVID-19 pandemic.108  The Federal Reserve Board created this first-
of-its-kind test, released in September 2020, to better analyze the capital 
strength and resiliency of the big banks throughout the COVID-19 
pandemic.109  This mid-cycle stress test, similar to the February 2020 
stress test, measures two different types of hypothetical scenarios: 
severely adverse and alternative severe.110  The severely adverse scenario 
consists of an unemployment rate peak of 12.5% and then a decline to 
7.5% through the end of 2021.111  The model also includes a 3% decline 
in gross domestic product from the third quarter of 2020 to the end of 
2021.112  The alternative severe scenario, on the other hand, records a 
slow decline in the unemployment rate from 11% to 9% through to the 
end of 2021, and a gross domestic product that drops 2.5% from the third 
 
capital conservation buffer was introduced to ensure that banks have an additional layer of 
usable capital that can be drawn down when losses are incurred.”). 
105. Global Systemically Important Bank, RISK.NET, 
https://www.risk.net/definition/global-systemically-important-bank-g-sib 
[https://perma.cc/QRE2-TQK6] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020) (defining G-SIB as a bank 
whose systemic risk profile is of such importance that its failure could trigger a global 
economic crisis).  
106. Large Bank Capital Requirements, supra note 102. 
107. Id. 
108. Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Releases Hypothetical 
Scenarios for Second Round of Bank Stress Tests (Sept. 17, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20200917a.htm 
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to the fourth quarter of 2020.113  The results of the mid-cycle stress test 
were released in December 2020.114 
IV.  CCAR AND DFAST IN 2020: HOW COVID-19 COULD INFLUENCE 
THE FUTURE OF STRESS TESTING 
The COVID-19 pandemic served as the first true test of CCAR 
and DFAST in a moment of crisis.115  However, the new sensitivity 
analysis created a sense of confusion about the process and raised 
questions about the original purpose of stress tests.116  
A.         The New Sensitivity Analysis: Lack of Transparency  
The delayed switch to the new sensitivity analysis raised a variety 
of criticisms.117  In addition to the confusion and the unclear, aggregate 
release of the banks’ results for the new sensitivity analysis, critics raised 
concern about the lack of public disclosure.118  While the Federal Reserve 
Board still released bank-specific information for the severely adverse 
scenario, that scenario had a maximum unemployment rate of 10%.119  
Meanwhile, U.S. unemployment rate had already reached 10.2% in July 
2020, with some individual states even reaching 16%.120  
The new sensitivity analysis stated that while many banks 
remained well-capitalized under the V-shaped model, several banks 
would reach their minimum capital levels under both the U-shaped and 
W-shaped model.121  This lack of transparency is exactly what SCAP, in 
 
113. Second Round of Bank Stress Tests, supra note 108. 
114. Id; see also Press Release, Fed. Reserve, Federal Reserve Board Releases Second 
Round of Bank Stress Test Results (Dec. 18, 2020), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20201218b.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LC4B-2CSV] (detailing the results of the second stress test, which showed 
that the banks were strongly capitalized when faced with the alternative severe and severely 
adverse scenarios).  
115. See Blackwell, supra note 12 (stating how Dodd-Frank will likely be impacted by the 
economic wave that COVID-19 will have on the banking system).  
116. See Tarullo, supra note 14 (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve 
Board’s confusing 2020 release of bank stress tests). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Hypothetical Scenarios for its 2020 Stress Test Exercises, supra note 65. 
120. Quarles, supra note 67; see also Unemployment Rate 16.1 Percent in Massachusetts, 
supra note 67 (stating the sharp rise in unemployment due to COVID-19). 
121. Additional Sensitivity Analyses, supra note 88. 
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response to the 2008 Financial crisis, sought to avoid.122  SCAP helped 
to restore confidence and credibility in the U.S. banking system by being 
transparent with market participants and consumers, which reduced fears 
about the possible collapse of the banks and U.S. economy.123  Some 
argued that the Federal Reserve Board refused to publicly disclose the 
sensitivity results because the analysis was an escape mechanism from 
negatively impacting the markets out of fear from the stress test 
scenarios.124  If the results were publicly disclosed, the Federal Reserve 
Board would have sent negative signals about the soundness of large 
banks.125  However, this lack of transparency raises even more concerns 
to market participants and consumers than what might have occurred if 
the results were fully disclosed.126  For example, the transparency and 
public disclosure of the SCAP program restored confidence in the U.S. 
economy by being honest with the American people, whereas hiding the 
financial standing of the big banks, even if strong, could reasonably lead 
to the conclusion that the Federal Reserve Board wanted to avoid the 
public disclosure of the results to obscure the fact that certain banks were 
struggling to meet minimum capital standards.127 
Vice Chair for Supervision, Randal Quarles, supported the lack 
of disclosure associated with new sensitivity analysis in light of COVID-
19.128  He characterized the new scenarios as simply scenarios and not an 
official stress test, as they did not follow the normal protocol used for the 
annual stress tests.129  Therefore, the public disclosure element often 
associated with the stress test was absent, raising both concern and 
confusion about the state of the U.S. banking system during COVID-
19.130  In support of the new sensitivity analysis, Vice Chair Quarles’ June 
 
122. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6. 
123. Id. 
124. Tarullo, supra note 14. 
125. Id. 
126. Id.  
127. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6; see also Tarullo, supra note 14 (noting the impacts 
stemming from the Federal Reserve Board’s confusing 2020 release of bank stress tests). 
128. See Quarles, supra note 67 (stating that the sensitivity analysis was not a stress test 
because the Federal Reserve Board did not publicly disclose the results and the scenarios were 
more in line with the forecast of the current economy instead of hypothetical scenarios). 
129. Quarles, supra note 67. 
130. See id. (detailing his opinion on the new adjustments to stress testing and the current 
stability of the banks). 
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2020 speech defended several aspects of the process.131  He noted that 
while COVID-19 upended the United States economy and markets, the 
banks remained strong.132  Compared to the 2008 Financial Crisis, big 
banks entered the COVID-19 pandemic with high levels of capital and 
liquidity.133   
Vice Chair Quarles also defended the unorthodox release of the 
sensitivity analysis,134  noting that the Federal Reserve Board chose not 
to follow the normal public disclosure process for stress tests because of 
the need for timely analysis.135  For example, the Federal Reserve Board 
avoided completely recalculating capital plans and instead made slight 
adjustments to the involved banks’ balance sheets to yield a more 
reasonable forecast in light of the current pandemic.136  Additionally, the 
sensitivity analysis reflected current economic forecasts influenced from 
COVID-19, rather than the normal hypothetical scenarios associated with 
the stress tests.137  In defending the aggregate release of information, Vice 
Chair Quarles stated that the purpose was to understand “the performance 
of the banking system as a whole; we did not provide any firm with firm-
specific results nor are we publicly disclosing firm-specific results.”138  
He ended his statement by concluding that the Federal Reserve Board 
would actively monitor the conditions of the banks in the coming 
months.139  
B.         A Waste of Time and Resources  
Another general concern raised about the release of the sensitivity 
analysis was why the Federal Reserve Board would make the banks go 
through with testing hypothetical scenarios released in February 2020 and 
release results in June of that same year while simultaneously conducting 
another sensitivity analysis.140  As a CCAR testing cycle takes several 
 
131. See id. (discussing how Quarles referred to the new sensitivity analysis as “not a stress 
test” and thus the lack of public disclosure was allowed).  
132. Id. 
133. See id. (stating that the thirty-four banks that participated in the sensitivity analysis 






139. Quarles, supra note 67. 
140. Tarullo, supra note 14. 
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months to complete, the Federal Reserve Board could have paused the 
2020 test between the months of February and the June deadline to adjust 
the test to more relevant economic figures.141  In addition, the Federal 
Reserve Board released yet another stress test in September 2020, which 
only furthers this argument.142  In 2009, SCAP worked because the 
Federal Reserve Board stopped current testing and reevaluated with 
metrics that were more in tune with the economic crisis.143  Therefore, 
the 2020 response of the Federal Reserve Board raises the question as to 
why the same approach was not taken here.144   In its release, the Federal 
Reserve Board stated that the sensitivity analysis will help judge whether 
banks would have enough capital if economic and financial conditions 
were to worsen, but that is exactly the function of stress tests.145  If the 
Federal Reserve Board was unsure as to what metrics to use to reflect the 
uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic, releasing a detailed analysis that 
may not have been wholly accurate would have undermined the 
credibility of the entire stress test process and reduced confidence in the 
Federal Reserve Board.146  
Some critics argue that the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the 
flaws in both DFAST and CCAR, and thus call for the end of the 
programs.147  This argument especially holds true for 2020, when banks 
still were required to prepare capital plans by June for a stress test model 
released in February that did not reflect the uncertainly of the economy 
due to COVID-19.148  Managers spent time providing internal results of 
the stress tests when they could have been serving customers or allocating 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id.; see also Second Round of Bank Stress Tests, supra note 108 (noting how the 
Federal Reserve Board released another stress test in addition to the one earlier in the year 
and the new sensitivity analysis).  
143. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6. 
144. See Tarullo, supra note 14 (“Faced with this, the Fed had three options.  First, it 
could shift gears quickly by substituting a COVID-informed stress scenario for the stale one.  
Second, it could suspend the dated stress test until markets stabilized and then recommence 
with an updated scenario.  Third, it could soldier on with its original test, ignoring the 
potential impact of COVID on bank earnings and losses.”). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id.  
148. See id. (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve Board’s confusing 
2020 release of bank stress-tests); see also Hugh Carney, Stress Tests for Midsize Banks are 
More Trouble Than They’re Worth, AM. BANKER (Oct. 26, 2017), 
https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/stress-tests-for-midsize-banks-are-more-trouble-
than-theyre-worth [https://perma.cc/3WLW-XS4C] (discussing how stress tests burden 
midsize bank and how one solution would be to call the end the programs). 
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their time elsewhere in the bank.149 Additionally, DFAST imposes 
significant costs on smaller to mid-size banks around the $10 billion 
threshold.150  These banks must produce thousands of documents and 
spend over 10,000 in compliance with stress tests, which in turn imposes 
a heavier burden on smaller to mid-size banks.151  
Conversely, the preparatory process has strengthened the capital 
of big banks over time.152  In 2020, the thirty-four banks involved in the 
annual stress test entered the pandemic with higher levels of capital and 
liquidity than during the 2008 Financial Crisis, indicating a safer lending 
regime and showing that banks have better conserved their capital over 
time.153  Additionally, when the stress tests are transparent with market 
participants and the American people,  as demonstrated through SCAP, 
disclosing stress tests ultimately ensures trust and credibility within the 
markets.154  
C. The Global Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic: What Has 
Worked in Other Countries? 
The European Banking Authority (“EBA”) took a different 
approach to stress testing in response to COVID-19.155  The EBA chose 
to postpone EU-wide stress testing until 2021, relieving pressure on the 
banking system.156  In addition, the EBA also postponed supervisory 
visits throughout 2020 and removed deadlines for reporting data to 
further this relief.157  This decision will allow banks to focus more on 
their core operations, such as support for their customers.158  However, 
the EBA will still carry out an EU-wide transparency exercise in order to 
 
149.  Carney, supra note 148. 
150. Id.  
151. Id. 
152. Quarles, supra note 67. 
153. Id. 
154. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6. 
155. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting the decrease in capital requirements 
instilled by the EU’s decision to postpone stress testing in light of the pandemic); cf. Tarullo, 
supra note 14 (critiquing how the Federal Reserve Board instituted more burdens and stress 
tests/analyses on U.S. banks during COVID-19). 
156. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting how the EBA’s decision to reduce 
regulatory burdens should help banks focus on more important services, such as with their 
customers).  
157. Id. 
158. See id. (discussing how the EBA’s decision to remove burdens on banks during 
COVID-19 allows for the banks to better allocate their time to deal with customer needs).  
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provide updated information on banks’ exposures and asset quality to 
participants in the market.159  This transparency exercise, which has been 
an annual analysis conducted by the EBA dating back to 2011,  includes 
data collected by the EBA from 129 banks across twenty-six countries.160  
The report releases the assets, liabilities, exposures, and asset quality of 
the banks involved to create transparency with the markets.161  In 2020, 
the EBA conducted both a spring and fall exercise which only looked at 
supervisory reporting data, reducing any additional burdens for banks 
during the COVID-19 pandemic.162  
 The EBA is also allowing banks to operate below their required 
capital level buffer to continue to finance households and corporations 
experiencing complications due to the COVID-19 pandemic.163  To aid 
in this financing, the European Central Bank (“ECB”) has increased 
lending to these banks through their Pandemic Emergency Purchase 
Programme (“PEPP”), which includes the purchasing of bonds from 
banks to free up room for more lending to business and households.164   
These adjustments in response to a financial crisis help to free banks from 
the regulatory burden of complying with stress tests during the pandemic, 
and instead allows the banks to instead focus their efforts on their 
customers and the economy.165 
V.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? REFORM AND OTHER SUGGESTIONS TO 
THE CHANGING ROLE OF STRESS TESTING 
While some critics push for the demise of the CCAR and DFAST 
programs, they fail to acknowledge that CCAR and DFAST have resulted 
in banks preserving capital to be better prepared for periods of economic 
 
159. Id.  
160. 2020 EU-wide Transparency Exercise, EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., 
https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-transparency-exercise 
[https://perma.cc/22WW-FQ35] (last visited Jan. 2, 2021). 
161. Id.  
162. Id.  
163. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting the decrease in capital requirements 
instilled by the EU’s decision to postpone stress testing in light of the pandemic).  
164. See Our Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK (2020), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/home/search/coronavirus/html/index.en.html 
[https://perma.cc/GJ4W-BUME] (last visited Jan. 4, 2021) (providing detail on the ECB’s 
PEPP program to help banks during the COVID-19 crisis).  
165. Jones & Canepa, supra note 15. 
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crisis like that experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic.166  The 
critique of these tests, instead, is centered on the lack of consistent 
procedural standards for stress testing during a financial crisis.167  In 
releasing the new sensitivity analysis, the Federal Reserve Board 
retreated from the values of public disclosure and transparency and 
moved towards a vague sensitivity analysis.168  The 2009 SCAP response 
restored confidence in the banks by being clear and honest about their 
capital state.169  As discussed, banks that initially failed the stress test 
were given one month to devise a new capital plan and six months to raise 
the necessary capital to satisfy it.170  Due to the new 2020 sensitivity 
analysis, however, the thirty-four banks were required to meet new 
capital requirements by October 1, 2020, giving the banks only three full 
months to reanalyze their capital plans.171  This rushed process only led 
to more confusion and added pressure to the banks during an already 
stressful pandemic.172 
In addition to revisiting the success of the SCAP response, the 
Federal Reserve Board should also seek influence from the EBA.173  By 
postponing the 2020 stress tests to the following year, the EBA relieved 
added constraints of EU-wide banks and allowed them to better allocate 
their resources to their customers.174  To maintain a sense of transparency, 
the EBA still planned to carry out EU-wide exercises to reveal the asset 
quality and exposures of the banks.175  Finally, the EBA allowed their 
banks to fall below their capital requirements, utilizing the buffers in 
place to continue lending to households and corporations while 
 
166. See Tarullo, supra note 14 (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve 
Board’s confusing 2020 release of bank stress-tests); but see Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 
(providing a detailed history on the creation of CCAR, DFAST, and SCAP). 
167. Tarullo, supra note 14.  
168. See id. (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve Board’s confusing 
2020 release of bank stress tests); but see Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (stating how the 
transparency of SCAP helped to restore confidence between market participants and the U.S. 
banking system). 
169. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (noting how the transparency of SCAP helped to restore 
confidence between market participants and the banks).  
170. Id. 
171. See Large Bank Capital Requirements, supra note 102 (stating the updated 
requirements for larger banks as well as establishing a timeline for response). 
172. Tarullo, supra note 14. 
173. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting how the EU’s decision to postpone stress 
testing in light of the pandemic decreased capital requirements). 
174. See id. (“The EBA said that some capital buffers have been designed for use during a 
downturn to ensure continued lending to the economy.”). 
175. Id. 
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additionally receiving support from the ECB.176  This relief, in addition 
to the continued transparency between the banks and EU market 
participants, could serve as a simpler, clearer process for CCAR and 
DFAST for future economic crises.177  
 The SCAP response showed that in times of crisis, transparency 
is key.178  One of the main purposes of SCAP was to publicly disclose the 
results of the stress tests to create a mode of transparency between banks, 
market participants, and the American people.179  By disregarding this 
approach, the new sensitivity analysis has lost a piece of the original 
purpose of stress tests.180  To save additional resources for the thirty-four 
banks,181 the Federal Reserve Board should have reevaluated their 
response during a time of economic crisis.182  After the Federal Reserve 
Board released the February 2020 stress test scenarios, aimed to be 
completed only in June 2020, the Federal Reserve Board should have 
halted the test in March to recalibrate new scenarios that better reflected 
the metrics of the COVID-19 pandemic.183  This adjustment would have 
given the banks a month to develop a new plan similar to what happened 
with SCAP.184   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Within the span of twelve years, the United States economy has 
faced two financial crises.185   In 2008, the collapse of the housing market 
 
176. Id.; Our Response to the Coronavirus Pandemic, supra note 164. 
177. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting the decrease in capital requirements 
instilled by the EU’s decision to postpone stress testing in light of the pandemic); see also 
Tarullo, supra note 14 (noting the impacts stemming from the Federal Reserve Board’s 
confusing 2020 release of bank stress-tests). 
178. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6. 
179. Id. 
180. Id.; see also Additional Sensitivity Analyses, supra note 88 (stating the results of both 
the 2020 stress tests and the additional sensitivity analysis). 
181. See Carney, supra note 148 (detailing the many adjustments needed for Dodd-Frank 
to be as effective as intended). 
182. See Tarullo, supra note 14 (suggesting that the Federal Reserve Board should have 
reevaluated their metrics and paused the initial stress test to better align with the market 
factors and risks of COVID-19).  
183. Id.; see Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting the decrease in capital requirements 
instilled by the EU’s decision to postpone stress testing in light of the pandemic). 
184. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (providing a detailed history on the creation of CCAR, 
DFAST, and SCAP). 
185. See ERIN COGHLAN, supra note 24 (discussing the factors that led to the 2008 financial 
crisis); see also Hauck, supra note 68 (providing a detailed timeline of the evolution of 
COVID-19 and its impact on the United States). 
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led to the 2008 Financial Crisis, resulting in the failure of over 450 
commercial banks across the country as well as a spiked unemployment 
rate of 10%.186  In 2020, the United States faced the COVID-19 
pandemic, leading to unemployment spikes of 16% in some states.187 
The Federal Reserve Board Board’s response to each financial 
crisis, however, led to adverse results.188  In 2009, with the development 
of the SCAP stress tests, the Federal Reserve Board allowed big banks to 
have one month to develop a capital plan and six months to adequately 
raise that capital.189  While there were many benefits to these sudden 
regulatory requirements, the most important was the public disclosure of 
the stress test results.190  The public disclosure requirement helped to 
rebuild trust in the U.S. economy by allowing market participants to learn 
of the financial standing of the banks.191   
  In 2020, however, the Federal Reserve Board required thirty-
four big banks involved in the annual stress tests to not only comply with 
an outdated stress test that had been exceeded by the economic conditions 
of COVID-19, but also comply with a new, vague sensitivity analysis, 
and a second annual stress test.192  The sensitivity analysis, classified to 
not be a stress test, allowed the Federal Reserve Board to evade the public 
disclosure requirement with normal stress tests.193  At the same time, the 
EBA postponed stress tests for 2020, allowing banks to delve into their 
capital buffers to meet customer requests and relieving regulatory visits 
until 2021.194  
 
186. See Labaton, supra note 22 (providing an overview of how the five big banks abused 
the relaxation of the net capital requirement); see also ERIN COGHLAN, supra note 24 
(discussing the collapse of the housing market that led to the 2008 financial crisis). 
187. Unemployment Rate 16.1 Percent in Massachusetts, supra note 67. 
188. See Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (noting how the successful implementation of SCAP 
restored confidence in the U.S. banking system); see also Tarullo, supra note 14 (“Why, then, 
in the face of an unprecedented economic situation and the powerful precedent of the 2009 
SCAP, didn’t the Fed quickly pivot to a meaningful stress scenario, require resubmission of 
banks’ capital plans, and suspend dividend distributions to preserve capital in the interim until 
more was known?”).  
189. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6.  
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Tarullo, supra note 14; see also Second Round of Bank Stress Tests, supra note 108 
(discussing the released of a mid-cycle stress test).  
193. See Quarles, supra note 67 (detailing his opinion on the new adjustments to stress 
testing and the current stability of the banks). 
194. See Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 (noting the decrease in capital requirements 
instilled by the EBA’s decision to postpone stress testing in light of the pandemic). 
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The Federal Reserve Board’s 2020 response to the COVID-19 
pandemic shows a deviation from the success of SCAP in 2009.195  By 
allowing for this deviation, critics have raised concerns about the 
credibility of the stress tests and the Federal Reserve Board as a whole, 
leading to a variety of misguided conclusions about the state of the U.S. 
banking system due to the lack of transparency with the public.196  Going 
forward, the Federal Reserve Board should revert to the more flexible 
SCAP procedures instead of the rigid adherence to a stress testing cycle 
and sporadic, non-public testing, while also considering the global 
response when faced with a future economic crisis.197 
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195. Compare Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (detailing how SCAP helped to restore trust in 
the U.S. banking system), with Tarullo, supra note 14 (discussing the vague and confusing 
release of the 2020 sensitivity analysis). 
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197. Clark & Ryu, supra note 6 (detailing how SCAP helped to restore confidence in the 
U.S. banking system through transparency and flexible time frames that allowed banks to 
reevaluate, build, and better manage their capital); see also Jones & Canepa, supra note 15 
(discussing how the EBA imposed less burdensome measures on EU-wide banks during the 
stress of COVID-19). 
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